Contrairement à une certaine idée reçue, nous montrons que l'ouverture du marché domestique par l'abolition d'un tarif douanier ne va pas nécessairement rendre moins profitable les fusions domestiques. Cette idée suppose implicitement que le tarif en question est prohibitif avant son abolition et qu'il le demeure après une fusion. Or ce n'est souvent pas le cas. Nous montrons, à l'aide d'un exemple, que l'abolition du tarif pourrait, dans certains cas, rendre la fusion domestique plus profitable.
It is often thought that tariff reduction should lessen the need for a policy aimed at discouraging domestic mergers. The reasoning is that the abolition of a tariff on imports would encourage foreign firms to enter, thereby increasing the number of firms serving the domestic market. Since the merger of a subset of firms in an oligopolistic Cournot equilibrium is profitable only if the number of firms in the subset is sufficiently large relative to the number firms in the industry (see Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds, 1983, and Salant, 1991) , increasing the number of firms in the domestic market will make it less likely that the merger is profitable and, presumably, less likely that it would occur.
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The above argumentation implicitly rests on the assumption that the tariff in question is sufficiently high to prevent foreign firms from selling in the domestic market. However, not all tariffs are prohibitive. Hence foreign firms may be present in the domestic market before it is abolished. Furthermore, even if the tariff is prohibitive, a merger of domestics firms may render it non prohibitive, thus inviting foreign firms to penetrate the domestic market. We show in this paper, using a simple linear demand and zero marginal cost example, that in the later two cases, abolishing the tariff may in fact make the domestic merger more profitable.
A number of authors have in the past studied various normative or positive issues related to mergers in a multi-country context. Some have looked at the welfare effects of international (i.e., cross-border) mergers or its comparison with the effect of national mergers (for instance Barros and Cabral 1994 , Falvey, 1998 , Kabiraj and Chaudhuri, 1999 , while others have stressed the interaction of competition policy and optimal trade policy in the context of oligopolistic competition (for instance Collie, 2000 and Horn and Levinsohn, 1997) . This paper is more closely related to those that consider explicitly the effect of tariff reductions on potential merger behavior of the firms. This is the case in Ross (1988) , Falvey (1998) and Long and Vousden (1995) . Ross analyzed the effect of a tariff reduction on the anticompeti-tive consequences, or price raising properties, of a reduction in the number of firms through merger. He models both a domestic dominant oligopoly and an international oligopoly and finds that in some cases a lower tariff serves to restrain price increases subsequent to a merger and in other cases it does not. In particular, he concludes that in an international oligopoly context, a unilateral tariff reduction should tend to discourage mergers between domestic firms and encourage them between foreign firms serving the domestic market. Falvey (1998) discusses various implications of trade liberalisation for the profitability of mergers. One of his findings is that trade liberalisation is likely to generate merger activity between firms in the previously protected market. Long and Vousden (1995) also arrive at the conclusion that a unilateral tariff reduction will tend to increase the incentive to merge between domestic firms, but show that the effect on the gain from merging depends on the size of the savings in marginal costs which results from the merger 2 .
Each of those last three papers has looked at the effects of a marginal variation in the tariff and hence cannot completely answer the problem addressed here. The question we pose requires that we consider the effect of a non marginal change in the tariff, i.e., its abolition.
This involves comparing the equilibria that occur before and after the abolition of the tariff.
A by-product of our analysis is that it may also serve to illustrate the fact that the effect of the marginal variation in the tariff is likely to depend on the level of the tariff at which these variations are evaluated.
In section 2, we briefly describe the model and its equilibrium. In section 3, we compare the profitability of a merger in equilibrium with and without the tariff, for different levels of the tariff. Brief concluding remarks follow in section 4.
Let P d and P f denote the market price on the domestic and on the foreign (rest of the world) markets respectively and let Q d and Q f denote the corresponding aggregate quantities on each market. The linear inverse demand functions will be denoted
We will assume that three firms produce the homogeneous good: one foreign firm (firm 0) and two domestic firms (firms 1 and 2). This means that markets respectively. For simplicity, we assume that there are no variable costs of production and no transport costs. The per unit tariff imposed on the exports of the foreign firm to the domestic market will be denoted t (t ≥ 0).
The profits of the firms are then
and the unique Cournot equilibrium is given by
and
We will assume interior solutions for all quantities except possibly q , all three firms sell on both markets.
If the tariff is prohibitive, the equilibrium profits are
Otherwise, with all three firms present on both markets, they are
Suppose now that the two domestic firms merge and let q 
After the merger, the tariff therefore becomes prohibitive whenever t ≥ β 2
. Otherwise, if
, the two firms are present on each market.
Whenever the tariff is prohibitive, the equilibrium profits will now be
whereas if both firms are present on each market, they are
We have so far assumed that there are no fixed costs. It is well known from Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) , and it can be easily verified from the above, that in the absence of fixed costs, the merger just described is not profitable. However, it will become profitable if sufficient fixed cost is avoided by merging. Assume then that each firm faces an identical fixed cost of F > 0 and, following Gaudet and Salant (1992) , let θ denote the threshold level of this fixed cost which would make the merger just profitable. The value of θ is given by
By the definition of θ, the merger will be strictly profitable if and only F > θ. In this sense, any intervention that increases θ renders the merger less profitable. In the case at hand, the value of θ will depend on t.
The preceeding analysis suggests that it is useful to distinguish four cases, along with the corresponding values for the threshold level of fixed cost: .
Case 1 represents the free trade reference case. In Case 2, the tariff is positive, but not sufficiently so to be prohibitive. In Case 3, the tariff is prohibitive before the merger, but not after the merger. In Case 4, the tariff is prohibitive both before and after the merger. This is illustrated in Figure 1 , which depicts, θ, the threshold level of fixed cost as a function of the tariff. The figure is drawn with values of the parameters set at β = b = 1 for illustrative purposes 3 . Notice that θ 4 is always smaller than θ 1 , independent of the values of β and b, but it is not necessarily negative -it will be positive if the slope of the demand curve in the foreign market (b) is sufficiently larger than that in the domestic market (β). The question we now want to ask is whether abolishing the tariff will render the merger more or less profitable. We do this by comparing the threshold levels for each of Cases 2, 3 and 4 to that in Case 1. If, for some i = 2, 3, 4, θ i > (<)θ 1 , then, in that case, the merger has to save a larger (smaller) amount of fixed costs than under free trade in order to be profitable, which means that abolishing the tariff makes the merger more (less) profitable.
The tariff is not prohibitive
When the tariff is not prohibitive to begin with (Case 2), we verify that
This means that the cost saving required for the merger to be just profitable in the presence of the tariff is greater than under free trade: paradoxically, trade liberalization increases the profitablity of the merger. The reason why this can occur is quite simple. Although abolishing the tariff reduces the joint profits (gross of fixed cost) of the domestic firms whether they are merged or not, it reduces it less if the two firms are merged than if they are not.
Notice that it is perfectly possible for an unprofitable merger to become profitable after trade liberalization. This is the case when θ 1 < F < θ 2 .
The tariff is not prohibitive only if the firms are merged
In Case 3, the tariff is prohibitive when the domestic firms are not merged, but not otherwise.
The reason is that, given the tariff, turning a monopoly on the domestic market into an asymmetric duopoly is attractive to the foreign firm, but turning a symmetric duopoly into an asymmetric triopoly is not.
In this case, the difference in the threshold levels of fixed costs is given by
and we verify that
Therefore the merger may be more profitable under free trade in this case as well, provided the tariff is not too high. This will occur if β/3 < t < β √ 30/4 − 1 . However, for a sufficiently high tariff (β √ 30/4 − 1 < t < β/2), abolishing it will make the merger less profitable. This is because, for t < (>) β √ 30/4 − 1 , the loss in joint profits to the domestic firms which results from abolishing the tariff is greater (smaller) if they are not merged than if they are, and is exactly equal if t = β √ 30/4 − 1 .
The tariff is prohibitive whether the firms are merged or not
Finally, the tariff may be so high that it is prohibitive whether the domestic firms are merged or not. This is Case 4, for which
In this case, trade liberalization always reduces the profitability of the domestic merger.
In fact, if θ 4 is negative, then the merger is profitable even in the absence of fixed costs, something which is not possible when there is no tariff, as θ 1 is always positive. 5 This occurs when β 2 > b 2 /2, which means that the domestic market is sufficiently more important than the foreign market.
Concluding remarks
Some of the quantitative results obtained clearly depend on the simplifying assumptions of linearity and on the fact that the number of domestic firms is twice the number of foreign firms. Those simplifying assumptions were made only to facilitate the demonstration that the argument that trade liberalization reduces the profitability of domestics mergers is not a clear cut one: it depends on the level of the tariff that is being abolished. The demonstration can easily be extended to more general assumptions on the demand and costs functions and on the number of firms.
less than eighty percent of the firms is not profitable.
